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INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I consider the judgment delivered April 16, 2002, by
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Colas Est SA v.
France.' The judgment concerned the interpretation of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.2
Colas Est SA, Colas Ouest SA, and Sacer SA-the "applicants" in the
jargon of the ECHR-were privately owned, but publicly held, limited
liability companies (socitis anonymes) operating in the road
construction business in the French districts of Colmar, Mrignac, and
Boulogne-Billancourt.3 In 1985, the applicants, together with fifty-three
other companies, were subject to a large-scale investigation carried out
by the French Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs,
and Repression of Fraud Direction Gjncrale de la concurrance, de la
consommation et de la repression des fraudes or DGCCRF) to
investigate suspicions of unlawful contract practices among large public
contractors. Pursuant to the relevant legislation, known as Order No. 451484 of June 30, 1945, DGCCRF investigators on two occasions in 1985
conducted coordinated searches and seizures on the premises of all fiftysix companies concerned. Their purpose was to discover and secure
documents related to the suspected anticompetitive activities. The

1.
Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 16, 2002), at
http://www.echr.coe.int. Pending publication in Reports of Judgments and Decisions, the
judgment is available (in French only) exclusively on the Internet. The European Court of
Human Rights ("the Court") is the authoritative supranational arbiter of claims under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, openedfor signature
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http:ll
www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf. For commentary on the case, see John
Temple Lang & Cesare Rizza, The Ste Colas Est and Others v. France Case: European Court
of Human Rights Judgment of April 16, 2002, 23 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 413 (2002).
2.
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8 (Right to respect for private and family life).
3.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at §§ 8-21.
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searches and seizures were made without a warrant, as this was not
required by the June 30, 1945 Order.4
In a decision of October 25, 1989, the French Competition Council
found, on the basis of evidence contained in the seized documents, that
the applicants had in fact been engaged in unlawful business practices,
and ordered Colas Est SA, Colas Ouest SA, and Sacer SA to pay FRF
12,000,000, FRF 4,000,000, and FRF 6,000,000 in fines, respectively.
The petitioners challenged the lawfulness of the searches in the Paris

Court of Appeals, which, on July 4, 1994, reduced the fines of the first
two applicants to FRF 5,000,000 and FRF 3,000,000, respectively, but
upheld the fine of the third applicant. Further appeals proved unsuccessful. In its judgment of June 4, 1996, the highest appeals court in France,
the Cour de cassation, rejected, among other arguments, the companies'

contention that searches and seizures without a court-sanctioned warrant
violated their right to protection of their "home" as understood in Article
8 of the ECHR.5 This final rejection of the companies' assertions of ille-

gitimate exercise of public power constituted the trigger for the filing of
an application before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
in which the companies claimed that French authorities, in their handling
of the case before domestic courts, had violated their obligations under

the European Convention on Human Rights.'
In the case, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held

that the right to the protection of one's home, as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, extended to the business premises of
the three companies. The court also held that French authorities had violated the companies' rights under this provision in respect of the searches

and seizures conducted in their offices without a court warrant. France

4.
This arrangement, incidentally, is not unique among European jurisdictions. In
Italy, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, for instance, prior judicial authorization
was not required at the time the European Commission adopted its White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, COM(99)101 final § 110,
where this arrangement was requested as standard procedure.
5.
The decisions of the three court instances involved are published in the Bulletin
officiel de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la ropression des fraudes for the respective dates of their pronunciation.
6.
The (now-defunct) European Commission of Human Rights, acting as the Court's
screening organ, found the original application partially admissible. See Colas Est SA v.
Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 21, 1998) (on admissibility), at http://
www.echr.coe.int (in French only).
7.
I use terms such as "corporations" and "companies" interchangeably for the sake of
convenience. It should be noted, however, that neither term is clear-cut, and they are not synonyms. I refer to "corporations" and "companies" when describing business entities of the type
encountered in Colas Est, i.e. publicly held but privately owned business entities with limited
liability and a presumed overriding for-profit objective.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:77
S8

was ordered to pay compensation to the three companies. The court,
moreover, appears to have accepted the adoption of a two-tiered scheme
of protection, according to which the protection of the privacy and home
of private individuals is to be interpreted with substantially greater vigor
than those protections as applied to juridical persons.
I am obviously mindful of the most important practical consequence
of the judgment: the ECHR now requires that public authorities regularly
seek a court warrant prior to carrying out investigative measures such as
searches and seizures on the premises of companies suspected of taking
part in anticompetitive activities. The holding is significant for the framing of the procedural rules according to which the Council of Europe
member states' competition authorities carry out their investigative
measures: searches and seizures of corporate premises without court
warrant may now run counter to the ECHR. The Colas Est holding has in
this respect marked a watershed also in the framing of the fundamental
rights protection of the European Union. Six months after the Colas Est
judgment was delivered, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), the supranational arbiter of private complaints against public authorities
implementing the laws and regulations of the European Union, held that
the fundamental right to protection of private activity as a general principle of Community law now extended to encompass corporate premises
and that searches and seizures on corporate premises must have prior
court authorization to be legitimate under EU law.9 The ECJ, in reaffirming that "the need for protection against arbitrary or disproportionate
intervention by public authorities in the sphere of the private activities of
any person, whether natural or legal, constitutes a general principle of
Community law,"' took into consideration the developments that had
occurred in ECHR case law since it established the general right to protection of private activity in 1989. It made particular mention of the
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Colas Est."
This aspect of the judgment is not the prime concern here. I am instead interested in the ways in which the Colas Est judgment signifies
doctrinal trends in the development of the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, I
8.
The Court was composed of judges Loucaides (president of the second section,
Cyprus), Costa (France), Birsan (Romania), Jungwiert (ER.G.), Butkevych (Ukraine),
Thomassen (Netherlands), and Mularoni (San Marino).
9.
Case C-94/00, Roquette Fr&es SA v. Directeur gdnfral de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de larepression des fraudes, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9039 (in French only), available
at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (in English). For commentary on the case, see
Christoph Feddersen, Anmerkung, I EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 22
(2003). The case is also mentioned in Section II.C below.
10.
Roquette Fr~res, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9039, 1-9053, 27.
11.
Id. at 1-9054, 1 29.

Fall 2003]

ProtectionAgainst UnwarrantedSearches and Seizures

81

have sought to make accessible the court's holding in the Colas Est case.
The decision warrants attention as this was the first time the court in direct terms extended the scope of the right to protection of one's home in
ECHR Article 8-a central privacy right under the Convention-to the
business premises of juristic persons. It thereby established a possibility
under the Convention's privacy provision that private activity in general,
and not only the activity and interests of individual human beings, may
have a legitimate need for protection against the arbitrary exercise of
public power. The judgment deserves attention also because the court, in
subscribing to a two-tiered mode of ECHR Article 8 protection in which
the privacy interests of non-individual actors are subject to a more lenient standard of judicial review than privacy interests pertaining to
individuals, seems to enter another novel area in privacy protection under the ECHR. As the judgment is available in its original French version
only, and thus potentially overlooked by a non-French-speaking audience, I believe it is important in its own right to convey the essence of
the Colas Est case.

Second, I have sought to situate the two novelties of the Colas Est
decision in their proper doctrinal landscape. I explain how the judgment
is a result of the private complaints system under the Convention, which
allows for-profit entities to file claims of human rights protection of their
own interests before a supranational human rights tribunal principally on
the same basis as individuals. I also point to the ways in which the decision, as a landmark in the development of privacy under the Convention,
can be rationalized in light of general instruments of adjudication applied by the court in Strasbourg. It has also seemed useful to place the
court's decision in a comparative context. The notion of corporate privacy protection might strike observers as peculiar considering the
ECHR's status as a human rights treaty. I point out, however, that the
protection of corporate premises under a privacy heading is a familiar
arrangement in several constitutional regimes, as is-at least to a certain
extent-the adoption of a lower-tiered mode of judicial scrutiny of corporate privacy.
I wind up my examination with some prospective thoughts on the
Colas Est decision's two doctrinal markers. I consider the decision's
accommodating view of including corporate actors among those able to
seek protection under ECHR Article 8 a welcome aspect of the
development of ECHR law. It signifies, I assert, a legal instrument which
is in transition in that it draws increasingly on its constitutional rather
than its international human rights law heritage.
This Article is organized in the following way. Part I presents and
assesses the parties' arguments and the court's reasoning regarding
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whether ECHR Article 8 is applicable to the claim at hand. It also places
in a comparative landscape the finding that Article 8 protects the business premises of companies. Part II presents and analyzes the court's
suggested acknowledgment of a two-tiered protection system in ECHR
Article 8 under which corporate premises enjoy less judicial protection
than do the homes of individual human beings. It places this rationale,
too, in ECHR and comparative perspectives. The Article concludes with
the prospective views indicated above.
I.

THE APPLICABILITY TEST

Two general questions arise when claims under ECHR Article 8 are
brought before the court. They were also central to the court's handling
of the Colas Est claim. The first issue, which is my concern in the present Part, is this: is Article 8, in principle, applicable to the case? This
question-the applicability test-must be resolved through interpretation
of Article 8(1), which sets out the rights protected and, if only implicitly
by the term "everyone," those actors entitled to protection under it. The
second issue, which turns on the interpretation of ECHR Article 8(2),
concerns the appropriate level of protection offered under the provision
once it has been found applicable. It is considered separately in Part II
below.
As I stated in the Introduction, the court found the Colas Est claim
admissible and ECHR Article 8(1) applicable to corporate premises.
Several reasons justify the court's holding of an extension of the concept
of "home" to encompass (at least, in some circumstances) the business
premises of companies. Some of them were mentioned explicitly by the
court. Others can be justified by reference to solutions adopted in constitutional regimes closely related to the Convention. Before I consider
these issues, I pause for a moment on the general right of corporate actors to rely on ECHR standards before the court, and on the ambiguity of
ECHR Article 8(1) in respect of these applicants.
A. The Right to Petition and Companies'
Interests: ECHR Article 34
The controversy surrounding the Colas Est decision lies not, it
should be emphasized, in the ability of companies in principle to utilize
the system for private complaints before the European Court of Human
Rights. The right to petition the court is open to individuals and entities
alike, regardless of their nature and purpose. ECHR Article 34 on Individual applications states:
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The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in
any way the effective exercise of this right. 2
The case law of the court and the European Commission indicates

that a company can be regarded both as a "person" and as a "nongovernmental organization" within the meaning of the provision.
Companies, or in exceptional circumstances, shareholders on their
behalf,'3 and other for-profit entities have made ample use of this opportunity for legal strategizing vis-a-vis public authorities on the level of
pan-European law. 4 Several hundred judgments by the court to date concern business entities' claims for human rights protection. The number of
complaints never to be considered by the court on their merits is significantly higher. 5 Seen against this background, the Colas Est decision

does not appear to constitute a controversial or remarkable incident in
the development of ECHR law.
B. The Ambiguity of Article 8(1)
The controversy surrounding companies' claims generally occurs
when the court is called to consider which provisions are applicable to
the corporate sphere and which are not. Significantly, most ECHR rights6
and freedoms have the capacity to protect the interests of companies.'
12.
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 34.
13.
The right to petition is restricted to those private actors whose interests are allegedly violated: the ECHR does not accept the commencement of actio popularis. This follows
from the requirement in ECHR Article 34 that the "victim" itself has the right to petition.

Despite the "victim" requirement inherent in ECHR Article 34, individual shareholders have
also, in certain circumstances, been granted locus standi to file petitions claiming violations of
their interests by measures taken initially against the corporate construct. As such, the corporate veil has not been regarded as impermeable in Strasbourg case law. See, e.g., Agrotexim v.
Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 22-26, §§ 59-72 (1995) (concerning expropriation of
brewery; standing for minority shareholders).
14.
The first judgment considering a complaint from a company was a freedom of expression case, Sunday Times v. U.K., 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (enjoining a newspaper
company from publishing articles on issues pending before a court).
15.
The number of company-initiated applications filed before the European Commission of Human Rights, the Court's former screening panel, was also considerable. An early
application again involved the Sunday Times consortium. See Sunday Times v..K., App. No.
6538/74, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 90 (1975) (admissibility). On the structural
changes in place since 1998, see Andrew Drzemczewski, A Major Overhaul of the European
Human Rights Convention Control Mechanism: Protocol No. 11, 6 COLLECTED COURSES
ACAD. EUR. L. 121 (1995-11).

16.
For details and citation of cases, see, for example, Marius Emberland, Duality and
Ambiguity: The Protection of Corporations' Interests under the European Convention on
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Companies have, for instance, successfully sought protection under due
process guarantees and other rights and freedoms generally thought of as
central to the rule of law such as the principle of no punishment without
law. 7 The protection of private property (Article 1 of the First Protocol
to the ECHR) is another right clearly applicable to the corporate sphere;
it is the only ECHR provision that explicitly says so.' 8 The freedoms of
expression (ECHR Article 10) and of organization (ECHR Article 11)
are similarly regarded as conventional instruments for the protection of
companies' interests.' 9 Some ECHR provisions are equally clearly found
by their very nature and purpose to be inapplicable to non-natural persons, such as companies. Consequently, there has, but for various
reasons, been little principled discussion about the applicability of these
provisions to the non-individual (and for-profit) sector. For instance, the
prohibition of torture and other forms of serious ill-treatment (ECHR
Article 3) is regarded as protecting the sphere of individual human beings only. ° The prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of physical

Human Rights, 2001 NOR. INST. HUM. RTS.: HUM. RTS. REP. 1. Other studies of the corporate
aspects of ECHR protection include Michael K. Addo, The Corporationas a Victim of Human
Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 187 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); James Strachan, The
Human Rights Act 1998 and Commercial Law in the United Kingdom, in COMMERCIAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

161 (Stephen Bottomley & David Kinley eds., 2002); Nicolas Bratza,

The Implications of the Human Rights Act 1998for Commercial Practice,5 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1 (2000); and Jan de Meyer, Human Rights in a Commercial Context, 5 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 139 (1984).
17.
See, e.g., Tre Traktorer AB v. Swed., 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (involving
limited liability company and its sole shareholder relying, inter alia, on the procedural safeguards in ECHR articles 6 and 7 in case concerning revocation of restaurant license
subsequent to unlawful tax evasion).
18.
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (1991).
19.
A typical Article 10 case is Groppera Radio AG v. Switz., 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1990). For Article 11 complaints, see, for example, Stallarholmens Plhtslageri o Ventilation
Handelsbolag v. Swed., App. No. 12733/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 111 (1990).
20.
This is generally believed to derive from the European Commission's admissibility
decision in Verein "Kontakt-Information-Therapie" v. Aus., App. No. 11921/86, 57 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 81 (1988) (admissibility), which concerned a nonprofit organization rather than a company. The view on inapplicability of Article 3 to legal entities was
nevertheless phrased in general terms by the Commission.
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liberty in ECHR Article 5 likewise is thought to be restricted by its very
nature to protect the interests of individual human beings."
Article 8, the provision under consideration in Colas Est, belongs to
a category of ECHR provisions around which there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the extension of scope to the corporate sphere.
ECHR Article 8 protects four different, but overlapping, privacy rights:
the rights to enjoy respect for "private life," "family life," "home," and
"correspondence." These rights are traditionally aimed at protecting
typically individual activity. Concepts such as "private and family life"
as well as "home" surely make the reader immediately think about activities that are intrinsic to the human being. On the other hand, the
provision's text does not explicitly exclude an extension of protection of
private activity to non-individual actors (and its rights are open to the
enjoyment of "everyone," itself an ambiguous term). The scope of the
Article, moreover, is sufficiently complex and/or ambiguous to prevent
the court from dismissing corporate claims by automatically referring to
their intrinsic nature and purpose only: the protection of "correspondence" is, for instance, easily reconcilable with non-individual activity
(business entities communicate or correspond as much as do individuals). The "private life" concept inherent in the provision is, besides,
traditionally believed to have a broader connotation than the sometimes
closely held individualized concept of "privacy" in Anglo-American legal thought. 3 Indeed, the court emphasized in Niemietz v. Germany that:
[I]t would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to
an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the
outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for
private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. 4
What contributes to the ambiguity of ECHR Article 8 is the scarcity
of indications in other sources, such as the Convention's preparatory
21.
Wouterse v. Neth., App. No. 46300/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 1, 2002) (on admissibility), at http://www.echr.coe.int is a recent example of two companies claiming protection
under Article 5 guarantees. The Court did not need to consider the merits of that part of the
claim.
22.
In addition to Article 8, these rights include the freedom of conscience and religion
in Article 9 and the prohibition against slavery and forced labor in Article 4. A recent example
of a company (as well as its individual shareholders) relying, in vain, on Article 4 is TW
Computeranimation GmbH v. Aus., App. No. 53818/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 6, 2003) (on admissibility), at http://www.echr.coe.int.

23.
D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
305-06 (1995).
24.
Niemietz v. ER.G., 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, 33-34, § 29 (1992).

RIGHTS
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works, and even its case law, of the status of corporate privacy under the
provision."
The essential task for the court in Colas Est, which concerned
applications from actors who were clearly not human but juristic
persons, was to weigh the force of the immediate reading of the
provision's text ("home") against doctrinal sources and modes which
might (or might not) favor an analogous application of the provision to
protect the premises of corporate persons, too. When authoritative
sources are absent, the general modes of argumentation applied by the
European Court of Human Rights, and the viewpoint of the individual
judges about the nature and purpose not only of the ECHR but also of
private corporate activity, unsurprisingly come into play. Mindful of
these considerations, I believe it is conceivable that the court had a
doctrinal leeway within which in principle it legitimately could have
chosen either conclusion (inapplicability or applicability) as far as the
Colas Est petition was concerned. It is against this background of
ambiguity and wide judicial discretion that the Colas Est rationale is best
analyzed.
C. The Relevance of PriorJudgments

In determining the applicability of Article 8 to the companies'
claims, the court first embarked on a lengthy discussion of prior case law
which had dealt with the possibility of privacy protection (under the
"private life" as well as "home" headings) in the context of business activities. The court has never found it essential to draw clear
distinguishing lines among the four concepts mentioned in ECHR Article 8(1). Neither has it offered exhaustive definitions of the content of
the different terms. The court instead approaches Article 8 rights with
considerable pragmatism and reason through a case-by-case basis.
Sometimes, the court does not even consider it important under which of
the four categories of privacy protection it categorizes the case at hand.
The fact that Colas Est dealt exclusively with the court's interpretation
of the concept of "home" does not, therefore, render irrelevant case law
relating to the other three privacy rights. In particular, case law relating

25.
G.J.H.

An introduction to the methodology applied by the Court is found in P. VAN
VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

DUK &
HUMAN

RIGHTS 71-95 (3d ed. 1998). See also F. Matscher, Methods of Interpretation of the Conven-

tion, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).

FOR THE PROTECTION

OF HUMAN

RIGHTS

63 (R. St. J.

Fall 2003]

ProtectionAgainst UnwarrantedSearches and Seizures

87

to "private life" is relevant, as this concept is seen as embracing the three
scope.26
other rights in addition to its own
The court first considered, and distinguished the present case from,
its former judgments in Miailhe, Crimieux, and Funke.27 These judgments had, incidentally, also concerned investigatory measures carried
out by French authorities. They did not, however, concern action against
corporate premises but searches and seizures of individuals' homes due
to suspected customs offenses committed in relation to the individual
applicants' business activities. The court apparently found it germane to
distinguish the present case from these judgments because the petitioners
claiming protection in Colas Est were doing so not merely in relation to
their business activities: they were themselves nonphysical (juristic) persons. The accommodating views on applicability adopted in the
Miailhe, Crimieux, and Funke cases were consequently of little relevance for the court as far as Colas Est SA, Colas Ouest SA, and Sacer
SA were concerned.
Two other judgments were regarded as more relevant vehicles for the
court's subsequent reasoning. Niemietz v. FR.G. dealt with the legitimacy under the Convention of police searches and seizures of a lawyer's
home office for the purpose of obtaining evidence in the criminal case
against the lawyer's client.29 The court in Niemietz had found that the
individual applicant (the lawyer) enjoyed protection of his "private life"
as well as "home" against the investigative measures in question, and
eventually held against the German authorities for the manner in which
they had been carried out. The court in Colas Est also cited its judgment
in Chappell v. U.K., in which it found that the right to respect for one's
"home" (as well as "private life") applied to premises that were used
simultaneously as an individual's residence and as an office for that
same individual's limited liability company.30 That claim related to the
intrusiveness of searches carried out by police in relation to a copyright
infringement case. To claim that Mr. Chappell could not enjoy protection
in his home against searches and seizures carried out in connection with
his business activities apparently would have been too formalistic an interpretation of both the "private life" and "home" concepts of the
26.
See, e.g., Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34, §§ 27-31 (considering the
individual applicant's claim under a "private life" and "home" heading in combination without
attempting to distinguish the two).
27.
Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 37 (Apr. 16, 2002), at
http://www.echr.coe.int. See Miailhe v. Fr., 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 75 (1993); Cr~mieux v.
Fr., 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 49 (1993); Funke v. Fr., 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 (1993).
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at § 40.
28.
29.
Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34, §§ 27-31.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at § 40 (citing Chappell v. U.K., 152 Eur. Ct. H.R.
30.
(ser. A) 3, 12-13, 26, §§ 26(b), 63 (1989)).
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provision, and the court found Article 8 applicable in that judgment
without further debate.
Chappell and Niemietz are the two judgments of the court that lie
closest to the facts in Colas Est. The reliance on them as starting points
for the court's reasoning was a strong indication that the court would
eventually find ECHR Article 8 applicable to the claims filed by Colas
Est SA and its companion applicants. But reliance on them did not constitute a sufficient justification in the court's view.
D. The Emphasis on Teleological Interpretation
The court recalled that in Niemietz it had stated that the term "domicile," which is equivalent to the English term "home" in the French
authentic version of the Convention, carried broader connotations than
its English counterpart and might encompass, at least, the offices of a
person exercising a liberal profession." The ECHR consists of two authentic versions, English and French authoritative texts." Although
official translations of the treaty exist in the languages of all Council of
Europe member states, only the French and English versions bind, and
equally so, the court.
When, as in the present case, the court is confronted with versions of
a treaty that are equally authentic but not exactly the same, the court
"must interpret them in a way that reconciles them as far as possible and
is most appropriate in order to realize the aim and achieve the object of
the treaty."33 This principle of interpretation, which derives from Article
33(4) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,34 has consistently
been applied by the court. In relying on Niemietz, the court in Colas Est
also subscribed to this principle of interpretation.
This mode of interpretation operates in concert with another principle consistently applied by the court, in which the court when
interpreting the Convention text places emphasis on effective rather than
formalistic interpretation. The principle of effective protection of ECHR
rights lies at the heart of the supervisory business of the court.35 It commands that the Convention is "intended to guarantee not rights that are
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.3 6 The
31.

Id. (citing Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34, § 30).
32.
The final sentence of the ECHR states: "Done at Rome this 4th day of November
1950, in English and French, both texts being equally authentic .... ECHR, supra note 1, at
256.
33.
See Wemhoff v. F.R.G., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9-10, § 8 (1968).
34.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
33, 4, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
35.
See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 15.
36.
Airey v. Ir., 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12, § 24 (1979).
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effectiveness principle "means, first of all, that the Court is inclined to
look beyond appearances and formalities" and rather focus on realities.37
This reliance on effet utile may also "lead the Court to adopt an extensive interpretation of the scope and content of the rights and freedoms of
the Convention."38 In extending the scope of ECHR Article 8 and the
protection of "home" to corporate premises, at least in certain circumstances, the court showed a willingness to ignore the formalism of the
English term "home" in favor of the pragmatism of everyday judicial
business. The principle of effective interpretation was not explicitly relied on by the court save for its reiteration of Niemietz's application of
the principle of teleological interpretation. It must nonetheless have had
some bearing on the court's views.
Because of the principles of effectiveness and purposeful
interpretation in the Vienna Convention, the court's approach to
interpreting the concept of "home" in ECHR Article 8 shifted logically
from formalistic-linguistic niceties (can a company have a "home"?) to a
teleological inquiry (what is the purpose of ECHR Article 8's protection of
the "home"?). As far as ECHR Article 8 is concerned, the court has
frequently stated that the essential purpose of privacy protection under the
Convention is "to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by
the public authorities."39 I now consider the two elements of this stated
objective.
The facts presented in Colas Est surely meet the second limb of the
objective: French investigators entered the companies' premises without
a court warrant (as this was not required by law). Yet, prior judicial authorization of intrusive activities into the private sphere by the executive
is a cornerstone of the rule of law on which the legal systems of the
Council of Europe build and which is central to the ECHR itself.40 Several indicators point to the court's emphasis on this second limb of the
stated objective. The court's willingness to extend the concept of "home"
to corporate premises was influenced by the court's eventual finding of a
violation of the applicants' privacy rights:4' the court mentioned particularly, as an argument for finding the provision applicable, the scale of the

37.

VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 25, at 74.
38.
Id.
39.
Niemietz v. ER.G., 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, 34, § 31 (1992) (quoting Marckx
v. Belg., 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15, § 31 (1979)).
40.
The fifth recital of the ECHR Preamble makes explicit mention of the rule of law.
ECHR, supra note 1, pmbl.
41.
The combination of the inquiry into the second and first limbs of the provision,
entirely conceivable from a practical adjudicatory viewpoint, also finds occasional expression
in the Court's explicit argumentation insofar as it does not by necessity consider them separately. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 305 (criticizing this mode of inquiry).
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investigative measures under scrutiny.42 The court, moreover, did not unreservedly extend the scope of ECHR Article 8 privacy protection to
corporate premises: its scope was to be interpreted widely only "in certain circumstances" ("dans certaines circonstances"). The court did not
specify the "circumstances" that actuate corporate privacy protection, but
it is fair to draw the conclusion that the measures in question in the
Colas Est case were exactly such circumstances.
What, then, about the first limb of the overall purpose of protecting
rights in ECHR Article 8? Colas Est SA and its companion applicants
were not "individuals" as the term is consistently applied by the court
when referring to the objective of privacy protection. Niemietz and
Chappell concerned, it is true, business premises, too, and that gives
these judgments' rationale some influence when interpreting the provision in the present context. But the contested measures in those cases
were carried out on the premises of individual human beings and where
those human beings also had their homes. The concern for the individuals in Niemietz and Chappell was crucial to the court's finding of
extension of "private life" and "home" to the business context in these
judgments. Indeed, in Niemietz, the court emphasized as a reason for its
generous interpretation of "private life" and "home," the importance to
the individual of "the right to establish and develop relationships with
other human beings," even in the business context. 43
How could the court extend the stated purpose of Article 8 to encompass the interests of the claimants in the Colas Est case? The three
applicants in Colas Est were socijtts anonymes, publicly held limited
liability companies that had no direct individual substratum except for
the fact that all entities, in the last instance, are composed of human activities. A publicly held company is characterized by its non-individual
nature and is distinguished from individual proprietorships, partnerships,
and closely held limited liability companies. Its individual substratum is
at best remote, both as far as ownership and as far as the needs of other
individuals in the company's organization are concerned. Harris,
O'Boyle, and Warbrick stated significantly in 1995 that "some interferences with wholly work premises might be protected against by relying
on private life but surely not as an aspect of the right to respect for one's
home."" Yet, this was exactly what the court did in Colas Est. The court
essentially widened the scope of privacy protection (as far as "home"
was concerned) to be read not as protection of individual activity against
42.
Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 42 (Apr. 16, 2002), at
http://www.echr.coe.int.
43.
Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33, § 29.
44.
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 318-19.
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arbitrary public action, but more generally as a safeguard of private activity against such forms of intrusion. Herein lies the remarkable
innovation in the court's Colas Est rationale as far as the applicability
test is concerned. How can this move be explained?
E. The Principleof Dynamic Interpretationand the
"Snowball Effect" of ECHR Interpretation

I see the answer to that question in the next step of the court's reasoning, the principle of dynamic (or evolutive) interpretation. 4 As the
court explained, this principle assumes that the ECHR "is a living in' 46
strument, which must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.
What this principle primarily entails is that the practical extent of ECHR
protection is not to be limited by the intentions of the Convention's
framers but, rather, is to be interpreted in light of current demands.
It is far from clear what exactly the court refers to when it refers to
"present-day conditions." Does it think of present threats to the interests
represented by the Convention, which presumably are greater than in
1950 when the Convention was adopted, or does it refer to a higher standard of fundamental rights awareness among its member states, which
consequently entails a broader interpretation of the treaty's human rights
norms? It is conceivable that the latter meaning of "present-day conditions" was subscribed to by the court. It does not, however, transpire
from the judgment how the court perceived the human rights climate in
France (or Europe more generally) in 2002 to be fundamentally different
than in 1950 as far as the interests of private economic enterprise are
concerned. Presumably, however, its underlying justification rests on the
general assumption that for-profit activity enjoys greater acceptance today than it did in the aftermath of World War II. This assumption holds
particularly true for France, whose private industry was significantly curtailed in the years after 1940. If the court meant to subscribe to the
former reading of "present-day conditions," it presumably must have
thought that free enterprise in Europe today faces a more rigorous regime of business regulation, particularly in the area of criminal
investigation, than it did in 1950. The court did not, however, indicate
the validity of this assumption, and it is also difficult to ascertain here.
On this interpretative mode, see, for example, Soren C. Prebensen, Evolutive Inter45.
pretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1123 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000); Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive
Treaty Interpretation,Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights, 42

GERMAN

Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1999).
46.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at § 41. The Court cited Cossey v. U.K., 184 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1990), as authority for the principle, although the doctrine has a longstanding
Court case law pedigree.
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These questions are, I suggest, at any rate, obsolete instruments for
understanding the court's reliance on the principle of dynamic interpretation and thus an evolutionary rather than an originalist meaning of the
Convention. The court, rather, subscribed to a fairly new meaning of the
principle, or at least a meaning of it which is mainly overlooked by
scholarly analyses and, in fact, the court's relevant vocabulary. The court
remarked that by virtue of dynamic interpretation it held in Comingersoll
SA v. Portugal that the scope of ECHR Article 41 (which gives an enti-47
tlement to compensation for violations of Convention rights)
encompassed an entitlement for nonphysical persons to receive monetary
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 48 Bearing in mind this milestone, as well as, the court said, its judgment in Niemietz, it considered
that "time had come" to acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, the
right to have one's "home" respected might include the protection of
corporate premises.49
What the court is doing here is significant. The court explicitly relied
on its holding two years before in its Comingersolljudgment, which, on
its face, is only remotely relevant for the interpretation of privacy rights
in Article 8. That case also concerned the status of a non-individual publicly held limited liability company in relation to court entitlements
which traditionally were thought to apply to individual human beings
only. More importantly, the court in Comingersoll also relied heavily on
the principle of dynamic interpretation as an argument for its broad reading of ECHR article 41.'0
47.
Article 41 provides: "If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party." ECHR, supra note 1, art. 41.
48.
Comingersoll SA v. Port., 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 365-66, §§ 33-35. I consider
the development toward full inclusion of corporate entities under ECHR Article 41 in: Marius
Emberland, Companies' Compensationfor Non-Pecuniary Damage: Comingersoll SA v. Portugal Before the European Court of Human Rights and the Ambivalent Expansion of the
Convention's Scope, 2003 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. (forthcoming).
49.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at § 41 (relying on Niemietz v. F.R.G., 251 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 23, 34, § 30 (1992)). In the words of the Court:
Dans le prolongement de l'interprftation dynamique de la Convention, la Cour
considre qu'il est temps de reconnaitre, dans certaines circonstances, que les droits
garantis sous l'angle de l'Article 8 de la Convention peuvent etre interprdtds comme
incluant pour une socidt6, le droit au respect de son si~ge social, son agence ou ses
locaux professionnels.
Id. In other words, considering the principle of dynamic interpretation, the Court believed it
was time to acknowledge that in certain circumstances, the privacy rights guaranteed by
ECHR Article 8 may be interpreted so as to include a right to protection of the business premises of company applicants.
50.
Comingersoll,2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 366, § 37.
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But the court both in Comingersoll and in Colas Est explained the
evolutionary requirement inherent in the principle of dynamic interpretation not by reference to the two alternative readings of the term "presentday conditions" mentioned above. Rather, the evolutionary aspect referred
to by the court was the gradual extension of the scope of ECHR rights
which it itself had undertaken in previous decisions. Put differently, when
referring to the need for dynamic interpretation, the court in Colas Est did
not, apparently, refer to a climate of heightened fundamental rights
awareness in Europe as far as companies' interests were concerned. Nor
did it refer to a climate of more extensive regulation of business activity
in Europe. The dynamism relied on was the internal dynamics in the
court's own case law. In short, the court's reliance on dynamic or evolutive interpretation in Colas Est, as in Comingersoll, was essentially a
subscription to the legitimacy of gradual and case-by-case extension of
the Convention's scope as a form of "snowball effect."
Although the acceptance of a "snowball effect" mode of dynamic interpretation was restrictedly applied in the court's emphasis on the
extension of privacy protection to corporate premises "in certain circumstances" only, the Colas Est case signals a novel way of interpreting
ECHR Article 8. As is evidenced by the Comingersoll judgment, this
view is in line with an emerging trend of Strasbourg jurisprudence which
acknowledges a gradual extension of the scope of ECHR guarantees
primarily by reference to the successful outcome of previous test cases in
other contexts. This is not wholly unproblematic, but it seems to be an
inevitable outcome of the ways in which the court approaches "hard
cases" of applicability in matters involving companies.
F. CorporatePrivacy Protection:A Comparative Outlook
As I have now explained, the seemingly surprising conclusion of the
Colas Est judgment in extending the concept of "home" to encompass
corporate premises is easily understandable when the general modalities
of the court's reasoning are taken into account. Yet, the decision contains
novel elements nevertheless. Thus, there is a need, I argue, to present
other factors that may legitimize the court's holding as far as the applicability test is concerned. One such cluster of factors is the solutions
adopted in comparable legal regimes.
I depart from the assumption that the European Court of Human
Rights, although the superior arbiter of claims arising under one particular human rights treaty, does not interpret the ECHR in a doctrinal
vacuum. The law of the ECHR rests on various doctrinal traditions of
municipal as well as international law character. The ECHR is alone
among the international human rights law treaties on civil and political
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rights in offering procedural as well as substantive human rights protection for actors other than individual human beings." There is, therefore,
little inspiration to be drawn from comparable treaty systems for human
rights protection. It is, however, conceivable that the court in Colas Est,
without saying so explicitly, was inspired by the construction of corporate privacy as a fundamental right being developed in constitutional
regimes that generally influence fundamental rights discourse. I examine
three such systems here.
1. The European Union
The European Union ("EU"), the Council of Europe's rival interstate
organization in Europe, acknowledges human or fundamental rights as
part and parcel of its general principles of law. These fundamental rights
are binding on the organs of the EU as well as on the organs of EU
member states in implementing the EU regulatory framework. The fundamental rights principles are court-made law, established by the ECJ
(ECJ) and, in more recent years, its Court of First Instance. The Luxembourg courts cannot adjudicate directly on the basis of the ECHR, as the
ECHR is not incorporated as EU law," although its standards are mentioned in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. But in
developing their general principles of a fundamental rights character, the
Luxembourg courts draw in part on the heritage of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 included.14 " Natural as well as
juridical persons can initiate proceedings in the Luxembourg courts and
rely on fundamental rights norms as part of their claim against the exercise of public power.55 As the EU fundamental rights norms are regarded
51.
I discuss the extent to which companies and their shareholders are protected by the
ECHR's two closest siblings on the international legal plane in: Marius Emberland, Companies and Shareholders Before the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court and
Commission of Human Rights, Jean Monnet Working Paper (forthcoming 2003), at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers03 .html.
52.
Case T-1 12/98, Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. 11-729,
11-753-54, 59. See also Wolfgang Peukert, The Importance of the European Convention on
Human Rights for the European Union, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVE, supra note 45, at 1107.
53.

6,

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Nov. 10, 1997, art.

2, O.J. (C 340) 145, 153 (1997), as amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM], availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treatiesfounding.html.
54.
This indirect influence is structurally similar to the Luxembourg courts' reliance on
the nonbinding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, pmbl.,

O.J. (C 364) 1, 8 (2000), availableat http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf.

55.
See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 230, para. 4, O.J. (C 340) 173, 272 (1997), as amended by the
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 53. On private parties' ability to seize the courts, see, for
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as vehicles for market integration in a much more obvious way than are
the norms of the ECHR, 16 and EU norms traditionally subscribe to a belief in the importance of facilitating free and private enterprise, it comes
as no surprise that companies have occasionally sought the Luxembourg
courts' determination of the extent of privacy protection of corporate
premises against public organs' investigatory measures comparable to
those encountered in Colas Est.
The ECJ established in its Hoechst AG v. Commission holding of
1989, and two companion cases, that corporate privacy protection was
considered a fundamental principle of Community law." The cases concerned the carrying out by European Commission officials of searches
and seizures of the offices of three publicly held limited liability companies. The companies, all involved in the polyvinyl chloride and
polyethylene business, were suspected of unlawful agreements with respect to fixing of prices and delivery quotas for such products." The
facts of the cases were, in other words, fairly similar to those of Colas
Est. The ECJ stated that there was a general principle of Community law
that "any intervention by the public authorities in the sphere of private
activities of any person, whether natural or legal, must have a legal basis
and be justified on the grounds laid down by law, and ...provide ...

protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention. 5 9 The court
example,

ALBERTINA ALBORS-LLORENS, PRIVATE PARTIES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:

(1996); ANGELA WARD, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES IN EC LAW (2000). More specifically, see also John D. Cooke,
Locus Standi of PrivateParties Under Article 173(4), 6 IR.J. EUR. L. 4 (1997); Paul Craig,
Legality, Standing, and Substantive Review in Community Law, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
507 (1994). However, the action subject to human rights litigation under the Charter of Fundamental Rights is markedly narrower within the EU framework than under the ECHR, as
only the implementation of Community measures can be challenged. The standing requirements contained in Article 230(4) of the Treaty on European Union are also interpreted more
narrowly than those contained in Article 34 of the ECHR. For a recent overview of the
requirements, see H.C. Rohl, Die anfechtbare Entscheidung nach Art. 230 Abs. 4 EGV, 60
HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 331 (2000). See also Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the
Action for Annulment Since Codoriu, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7 (2001).
56.
See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 102-29 (1999).
57.
Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859; Case
85/87, Dow Benelux NV v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 3137; Joined Cases 97-99/87, Dow
Chem. Ibdrica SAv. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 3165.
58.
For commentary on the cases, see R.K. Lauwaars, Annotation, Joined Cases 46/87
and 227/88, Hoechst A.G. v. Commission, Judgment of 21 September 1989; Case 85/87, Dow
Benelux NV v. Commission, Judgment of 17 October 1989; Joined Cases 97-99/87, Dow
Chemical Ibrica S.A. et al. v. Commission, Judgment of 17 October 1989; not yet reported,
27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 355 (1990); Josephine Shaw, The Common Market: Competition
and IndustrialProperty, 15 EuR. L. REV. 326 (1990).
59.
Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2924, 19. The rationale was reiterated in Dow Benelux,
1989 E.C.R. at 3157,1 30, and Dow Chem. Ibirica, 1989 E.C.R. at 3186,1 16.
CHALLENGING COMMUNITY MEASURES
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simultaneously stressed, however, that this was not the same as saying
that there existed a general fundamental right concerning the inviolability of the business premises of legal persons. The court conceded that
individuals had a fundamental right to inviolability of their homes, but
an extension of this principle to encompass corporate premises did not
necessarily follow from this conclusion. The court, in making this distinction, relied on ECHR Article 8, whose protective scope, the ECJ
considered, "is concerned with the development of man's personal freedom and may not therefore be extended to business premises."6 The
longstanding prevalence of the ECJ's narrow interpretation of ECHR
Article 8 is considered in more detail in Part II below. For the time being
I rest assured that the EU fundamental rights regime offers considerable
protection of corporate privacy, including, in principle, the protection of
business premises against certain searches and seizures.
2. The United States
The analog to ECHR Article 8's protection of "home" in U.S. constitutional law is found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The provision provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" shall not be violated.6'
The U.S. Supreme Court has for a long time accepted that corporations are understood as belonging to the category "people" to which the
Fourth Amendment refers and that their business premises are regarded
as "houses" within the meaning of the same provision. In Hale v. Henkel,
the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to consider the extension of
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to
corporate premises in a case which concerned investigative measures
against suspected price fixing in the tobacco industry. 6' The majority of
the Justices considered that such a right existed. Since 1906, the principle of this holding has not been seriously contested.
What has been the subject of some controversy, however, is how the
rationale is justified. In Hale, Justice Brown argued for the Court. "A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a
collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to
such body.' 63 The Court, in other words, relied on a particular theory
60.
Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2924, 18. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) added
that there was no ECHR case law supporting a claim for protection of corporate premises. The
judgment was delivered prior to Niemietz v. ER.G., 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23 (1992).
61.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
63.
Id. at 76.
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which justifies juristic personhood-the aggregate theory-which sees
the individual human being's presence in the corporate structure as significant for the extension of fundamental rights to corporate persons.
This is unsurprising, as the theoretical discussions of how corporate personhood could be legitimized were very much in vogue at the time.
The rationale has been explained on other grounds, as well. In a
judgment delivered prior to Hale, the Court had stated that the Fourth
Amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment forbid "the invasion of
[the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by ...conviction of
some public offence."64 The emphasis on a property-rights justification
for the protection of privacy (and home) had been seen as an additional
argument for the acknowledgment of constitutional protection against
arbitrary searches and seizures of corporate premises under the Fifth
65
Amendment. More recently, the rationale of corporate premises protection under the Fifth Amendment has been explained primarily by relying
on the purpose of the provision as a safeguard against arbitrary and ex66
cessive public interference with private affairs. This teleological aspect
bears considerable similarity to the justification offered, in part, by the
European Court of Human Rights in Colas Est.
3. Germany
The German federal constitution's protection of privacy offers another system comparable to that adopted by the European Court of
Human Rights in Colas Est.67 As translated into English, Article 13 (defining "home") of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law or Constitution)
of 1949 provides:
(1) The home is inviolable.
(2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of
danger resulting from any delay, by other organs legally
specified, and they may be carried out only in the form
prescribed by law.

64.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
65.
See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REv. 793, 820 (1996).
66.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978).
67.

For accounts in English of German constitutional rights protection, see SABINE
& LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1999); MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN BASIC LAW: THE CONTRIBUTIONS
MICHALOWSKI

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNA-

TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Christian Starck ed., 1983).
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(3) If specific facts lead to the assumption that someone has
committed a very grave crime, technical means of eavesdropping
in homes where that person probably stays may be ordered by
court if the investigation by other means would be unproportionally obstructed or without chance of success. The measure has to
be limited. The order is issued by a court of three justices. In the
event of danger resulting from any delay, the order can be issued
by a single judge.68
The provision was primarily intended as a safeguard for the home of
individuals, an intention which also follows clearly from the wording of
the German text ("Wohnung"). The normative starting point for inquiries
into its extension is that the provision derives its primary legitimacy
from the individual's inherent worth and his or her need for free personal
development in an elementary space of autonomy.6 9 The provision is in
this respect similar to the majority of fundamental rights provisions in
the Grundgesetz. Article 19(3) of the Grundgesetz, however, permits the
extension of constitutional rights protection to juristic persons, companies included,
provided
that the nature of the right in question makes this
•
•
70
extension possible.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 13 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW
23,
1949) 23-24 (Axel Tschentscher trans., 2003) [hereinafter Tschentscher]. The Article 13 in the
German text reads:
68.

(GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (MAY

(1) Die Wohnung ist unverletzlich.
(2) Durchsuchungen durfen nur durch den Richter, bei Gefahr im Verzuge auch
durch die in den Gesetzen vorgesehenen anderen Organe angeordnet und nur in der
dort vorgeschriebenen Form durchgeftihrt werden.
(3) Begriinden bestimmte Tatsachen den Verdacht, dal3 jemand eine durch Gesetz
einzeln bestimmte besonders schwere Straftat begangen hat, so dirfen zur Verfolgung der Tat auf Grund richterlicher Anordnung technische Mittel zur akustischen
Uberwachung von Wohnungen, in denen der Beschuldigte sich vermutlich aufhilt,
eingesetzt werden, wenn die Erforschung des Sachverhalts auf andere Weise unverhaltnismiBig erschwert oder aussichtslos ware. Die Mal3nahme ist zu befristen.
Die Anordnung erfolgt durch einen mit drei Richtern besetzten Spruchkorper. Bei
Gefahr im Verzuge kann sie auch durch einen einzelnen Richter getroffen werden.
Id. art. 13.
69.
See

HERBERT BETHGE, DIE GRUNDRECHTSBERECHTIGUNG JURISTISCHER PERSONEN

NACH ART. 19 ABS. 3 GRUNDGESETZ [THE ENTITLEMENT OF JURISTIC PERSONS TO FUNDA-

19] 76-77 (1985).
70.
Article 19(3) provides: "Die Grundrechte gelten auch fir inlandische juristische
Personen, soweit sie ihrem Wesen nach auf diese anwendbar sind." GG art. 19, 1 3. Somewhat
inaccurately translated in Tschentscher, supra note 66, at 27, as "Basic rights also apply to
domestic corporations to the extent that the nature of such rights permits." It is clear that companies are regarded as "juristic persons" within the meaning of GG Article 19(3). For German
judgments concerning publicly held limited liability companies (Aktiengesellschaft or AG),
MENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE
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The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the federal constitutional court, has
established that Article 13(1), governing protection of the "home," extends so as to encompass the business premises of companies. This
interpretation was originally laid down in 1971 in a case which concerned a petition from the proprietor of a closely held cleaning service
against the lawfulness of standard government inspections of his company's premises. In that decision the court held that the term "Wohnung"
should be widely interpreted so as to include working places and business and trading premises.' The judgment did not concern searches and
seizures as those conducted in Colas Est. Neither did it relate to business
premises of publicly held limited liability companies such as the Colas
Est petitioners. But the constitutional court phrased its rationale in general terms, and it has been foundS applicable
in other business entities'
72
complaints in subsequent decisions. There is, therefore, no doubt that
Article 13(1) of the German Constitution applies to business premises in
the same way that ECHR Article 8 does after Colas Est.73
The court marshaled several arguments in justifying its stance. One
significant factor was tradition: German courts had for more than one
hundred years interpreted similar constitutional provisions (federal and
state) as covering business premises along with individual homes, and
the drafters of the 1949 Constitution knowingly wanted to include this
jurisprudential heritage in the new constitution.74 Such wide interpretation, the court argued, was also known in several foreign constitutions.
It was also the only interpretative solution which would be reconcilable
with another constitutional interpretation, notably to include free enterprise as part and parcel of the right to individual freedom in Article 2 of
the Grundgesetz.76 It has also been argued,
this is not found in
the decision itself, that a different solution although
would be discriminatory:
it

see the following decisions by the Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] (ER.G.): BVerfGE 23, 208 (223); BVerfGE 29, 260 (265-66).
For judgments concerning privately held limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit
beschrankterHaftung or GmbH), see BVerfGE 3, 359 (363); BVerfGE 4, 7 (12); BVerfGE 10,
200 (215); BVerfGE 20, 323 (336); BVerfGE 21, 261 (278); BVerfGE 30, 292 (304, 312).
71.
BVerfGE 32, 54 (68-69).
72.
See BVerfGE 42, 212 (219) (concerning the extension of the provision to the
premises of a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft)); BVerfGE 76, 83 (88) (to the
premises of a GmbH).
73.
See, e.g., Matthias Herdegen, Artikel 13, in BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
GRUNDGESETZ §§ 30-35, 39-40 (Rudolf Dolzer et al. eds., 1993); Theodor Maunz & HansJirgen Papier, Artikel 13, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR §§ 10-18 (Theodor Maunz &
Ginter Dtirig eds., 1999).
74.
BVerfGE 32, 54 (69-71). See also Gilbert Gornig, Artikel 13, in 1 DAs BONNER
GRUNDGESETZ 1558, 1578 (Hermann von Mangoldt et al. eds., 1999).
75.
BVerfGE 32, 54 (70).
76.
Id. at 70-7 1.
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would run counter to the prohibition against discrimination should, say, a
proprietorship consisting of one individual businessman have the right to
protection of his premises but not a business set up as a limited liability
77
company.
II. THE

APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION

I have so far concentrated on the court's interpretation of the requirement of applicability set out in ECHR Article 8(1). As the court
found in favor of the applicant companies' contention that "home" indeed included business premises for the purpose of ECHR protection, it
had to consider, as a separate issue, whether Article 8(2) was violated.
The main thrust of the argument in the present Part is that the court, as a
result of its flexible interpretation of Article 8(1) toward inclusion of
corporate premises, had to make amends for its apparent judicial activism. To soothe the sentiments of the respondent state, or, more precisely,
to consider the legitimate interests of French authorities in checking on
suspected anticompetitive activity, the court had to evoke means that sufficiently signaled that its sweeping interpretation of Article 8(1) did not
necessarily entail a corresponding protective mechanism in the facts of
the case at hand. The court, in short, implied its adoption of a system of
differentiated scrutiny under which corporate premises enjoy a lower
degree of protection than do the residences of individual persons. This,
too, finds resonance with solutions adopted in comparable constitutional
regimes.
A. "Necessity" and the Possibilityof a Double Standard

This question relates to the interpretation of Article 8(2) of the Convention. This second inquiry, which in reality concerns the choice of an
appropriate level of scrutiny for the actions of national authorities, is
resolved through the application of a three-part test, the framework for
which is outlined in Article 8(2). For a state's interference with an interest protected under Article 8(1) to be judged legitimate under the
Convention, the public interference (in Colas Est, the searches and seizures carried out without a court warrant) must, first, have a sufficient
basis in national law. Second, it must have been exercised in the pursuit
of objectives regarded as legitimate under Article 8(2). Finally, the interference must also be found "necessary in a democratic society."7 8 As
77.
Philip Kunig, Artikel 13, in 1 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 791, 795-96 (Ingo von
Munch & Philip Kunig eds., 4th ed, 1992).
78.
For details on this mode of inquiry, see, for example, HARRIS ET AL., supra note 23,
at 283-355; VAN DIUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 25, at 489-540.
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only the necessity requirement was of interest in Colas Est, the court's
handling of the other two requirements is left unanalyzed here.7 9
1. The Discretionary Nature of the Necessity Test:
Proportionality and Margin of Appreciation
The necessity test consists further of a bundle of judicial subinquiries, with one important aspect being its implicit principle of proportionality. A state's interference with interests protected under Article
8(1) must be deemed a proportionate means for the fulfillment of its
stated (and legitimate) objectives. This test entails a complex balancing
exercise in which the court enjoys wide judicial discretion. The court,
moreover, has consistently held that it is primarily for national authorities themselves to determine whether their actions have fulfilled the
necessity requirement and its implicit proportionality assessment. The
court will only supervise the assessment of their determination when it
considers it pertinent (that judgment itself depending on an assessment
of all elements of the case at hand).8' This peculiar deference to national
authorities, referred to as the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, is the
result of the court's invention of a balancing act between national sovereignty considerations and the need for supranational supervision of
ECHR norms.

82

I am not concerned here with the details of the necessity requirement, nor the general content of its implicit proportionality and margin
of appreciation assessments. Suffice it to say that a central consideration
79.
Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 32, 35, 43-44 (Apr. 16,
2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int.
80.
Scholarly analyses of the second test are plentiful. Particularly instructive comments in English include John Joseph Cremona, The Proportionality Principle in the
Jurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND
BEWAHRUNG 323 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995); Marc-Andr6 Eissen, The Principle of
Proportionalityin the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 125.
81.
For detailed studies of the margin of appreciation doctrine under Article 8, see Yutaka Arai, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 41 (1999); Clare Ovey, The
Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 10 (1998).
82.
On the margin of appreciation doctrine in general scholarly analyses, see Eva
Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
240 (1996); Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European
Court of Human Rights, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 638 (1999); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin
of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 25, at 83; Lord Mackay of Clashfem, The Margin of Appreciation and the Need for Balance, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 45, at 837;
HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
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for the court in its determination of the fulfillment of the necessity requirement, for which the principles of proportionality and margin of
appreciation give it considerable discretion, is the extent to which public
authorities have acted in ways that imply arbitrariness or intrusiveness.
The French government argued before the court that the level of protection offered to limited liability companies under Article 8's necessity
standard should be lower than the level offered to individual applicants.
Relying on statements in its Niemietz judgment,83 the court considered
that juristic persons should not be able to assert a right to protection for
commercial premises with the same intensity as individuals could for
premises utilized for the exercise of a liberal profession (as was the case
in Niemietz).4 In other words, public authorities, under the necessity test,
should be allowed to interfere with the "home" rights of a company to a
greater degree than they could with the same rights of individuals. Relying on this more lenient necessity test, the government argued that no
violation existed in this case."
The applicants, for their part, argued that the investigative measures
taken by the French authorities were disproportionate means for achieving their stated purpose. The state authorities had not, therefore, struck
the right balance between ends and means when they entered the offices
of the companies and seized documents without a court warrant for the
sole objective of discovering an illegal contractual practice. Interestingly,
the applicants did not denounce the more lenient standard for corporate
privacy protections suggested by the French government. Rather, the
applicants sought recourse in the alleged disproportionate nature of the
state action, as viewed in light of previous judgments interpreting Article
8 in a business-related context, most notably the Miailhe, Crgmieux, and
Funke judgments. 86 The applicants argued that the requirement of necessity remained unfulfilled by the state regardless of the possible existence
83.
84.

Niemietz v. F.R.G., 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23 (1992).
In the words of the judgment, the government:

souligne que si la Cour a prdcis6 que le domicile professionnel bndficiait de la protection 6noncfe par l'Article 8, il s'agissait cependant, chaque fois, de locaux
dans lesquels une personne physique exerqait son activit6. S'appuyant sur l'arr~t
Niemietz, il considre qu'en 1'esp6ce, s'agissant des locaux professionnels des requdrantes, des socift6s anonymes, l'ingfrence pouvait "fort bien aller plus loin." I
soutient que si les personnes morales peuvent se voir reconnaitre, au sens de la
Convention, des droits similaires, Aceux reconnus aux personnes physiques, pour
autant, les premieres ne sauraient revendiquer un droit A la protection des locaux
commerciaux avec la mfme intensitd qu'un individu pour son domicile professionnel.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 at § 30.
85.
Id. § 34.
86.

Id. §§ 35-37.
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of a lower-tiered scheme of privacy protections for companies." They
maintained, further, that the more lenient scrutiny test at any rate should
not be applied in their case, as the documents which had been seized by
about their employees, as well
the government contained personal
•
• details
88
as ordinary commercial information. Thus, the applicants also seemed
to rely on an implicit requirement in Article 8 of a certain nexus between
the protection of privacy generally and the activities of natural persons.
2. The Court's Evasive Stance
It seems evident that the outcome of the balancing exercise inherent
in this test would depend on the acceptance by the court of a lower-tiered
scheme of privacy protections for corporate premises. However, by referring to the respondent state's contention for such a doctrine (to which the
companies implicitly had acceded) at the beginning of its proportionality
89
assessment, the court appears to have dodged a general conclusion on
the possible existence of a double standard. The court in fact recalled
that the exceptions outlined in Article 8(2) are to be narrowly interpreted, 90 and that any degree of necessity must be established in a
convincing manner to be so exempted. 91
Relying on statements in its judgments in Funke, Crmieux, and
Miailhe, the court found that, in order to fall within the exceptions outlined in Article 8(2), measures of the sort taken against the three
applicant corporations must be grounded in a combination of legislation
and state practice which offers adequate guarantees against abuse of such
measures. Due to both the nature of the original legislation and its interpretation in practice, the court found that such guarantees were lacking
in the present case. The measures themselves had been rather too sweeping. Most importantly, no court warrant had been required. This removed
the possibility of judicial oversight of the measures in question. 9' The
court therefore concluded that even supposing that the right of public
authorities to interfere with protected interests was more extensive in
relation to the premises of juristic, rather than natural, persons, the

87.

Id. §§ 35-38.

88.
Id. § 38.
89.
Id. § 42.
90.
This is a general principle of interpretation of the requirements for legitimate interferences under ECHR Article 8.
91.
Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 47 (Apr. 16, 2002), at
http://www.echr.coe.int (relying on Klass v. F.R.G., 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, § 42
(1978); Funke v. Fr., 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7, 24, § 55 (1993); Crdmieux v. Fr., 256 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 49, 62, § 39 (1993); and Miailhe v. Fr., 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 75, 89, § 36
(1993)).
92.
Colas Est, App. No. 37971/97 § 48.
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French authorities
had violated the Article 8 right of the three applicant
S 93
companies.
Although the court avoided direct discussion of the two-tiered
scheme of privacy protections under Article 8-it apparently did not
think it a crucial question for the outcome of the case-it seems nonetheless true that the court was willing to admit a lower standard of
protection for the privacy of corporate premises. How did the court come
to this conclusion? This is the question to which I now turn. I start by
placing it in the context of ECHR law. Thereafter, I seek to explain it by
casting a glance at solutions adopted in comparable constitutional regimes.
B. The Double Standardin the Context of ECHR Law

One possible explanation for the adoption of a double standard is
that it fits with Convention law with respect to certain other provisions as
far as companies' interests are concerned. In general, ECHR case law
does not appear to consider companies' claims for protection discriminatorily to the detriment of the corporate sphere. More often than not
companies' interests seem to be safeguarded subject to a standard of judicial scrutiny similar to that applicable to individual human beings.
Comprehensive analyses of decisions involving companies (or other
business entities for that matter) undertaken for the purpose of this Article do not suggest that companies' claims generally are considered
discriminatorily in this manner. Corporations enjoy, for instance, a similar level and range of protection under the due process clause in ECHR
Article 6 as do individuals. Similarly, there is no evidence that companies are subject to a system of differentiated scrutiny under Article 1 of
the First Protocol to the ECHR (the right to property).
The court has, however, in one other context-freedom of expression--developed a two-tiered rationale pursuant to which commercial
expression (by individuals and companies alike) is scrutinized according
to a more lenient standard of supranational judicial review than other
forms of speech protected by ECHR article 10. In markt intern Verlag
GmbH v. Germany, the court majority found that domestic authorities'
93.

In the words of the Court itself:

Dans ces circonstances, Asupposer que le droit d'ingfrence puisse aller plus loin
pour les locaux commerciaux d'une personne morale (voir mutatis mutandis arrt
Niemietz c. Allemagne ... § 31), la Cour considre, eu 6gard aux modalitds ddcrites plus haut, que les oprations litigieuses mendes dans le domaine de la
concurrence ne sauraient passer comme 6troitement proportionn6es aux buts 1dgitimes recherchrs.
Id. § 49.
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margin of appreciation assessment under Article 10(2)'s necessity requirement-a requirement similar to that in Article 8(2)-was wider in
respect of commercial expression because such activity concerned economic activity. In an area as complex as economic activity, the majority
argued, public authorities should be granted a wider discretion to assess
for themselves whether they were in compliance with the provision in
article 10. In the words of the majority:
The Court has consistently held that the Contracting States have
a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and
extent of the necessity of an interference, but this margin is subject to a European supervision as regards both the legislation and
the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent
court ....Such a margin of appreciation is essential in commercial matters and, in particular, in an area as complex and
fluctuating as that of unfair competition. Otherwise, the European Court of Human Rights would have to undertake a reexamination of the facts and all the circumstances of each case.
The Court must confine its review to the question whether the
measures taken on the national level are justifiable in principle
and proportionate. 94
The minority in markt intern explicitly denounced the adoption of a
lower standard of scrutiny for economic activity protected by Article 10.
Their view is a powerful one, as the case was decided by a 10-9 vote
with the swing vote cast by the president of the court. The minority
found the reasoning of the majority "a cause for serious concern" and
stated that: "[iut is just as important to guarantee the freedom of expression in relation to the practices of a commercial undertaking as it is in
relation to the conduct of [for instance] a head of government." 95 The
lower standard remains, however, the binding norm on article 10 interpretation in the economic and commercial context.96

The markt intern rationale is not entirely clear as to the reasons for a
lower standard of protection for commercial activity. The majority
pointed to the "complex and fluctuating" nature of competition issues,
an argument which could easily be interpreted as restricted only to such
97
forms of competition regulation as were at stake in that case. The ra94.

markt intern Verlag GmbH v. F.R.G., 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-20, § 33

(1989).
95.
96.
97.
plex and

Id. at 23-24 (joint dissenting opinion).
See VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switz., 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 243, 264, § 69.
The Court, however, has generally labeled all forms of economic activity as "comfluctuating" and consequently susceptible of a wider national margin of appreciation.

See id. (referring to advertising in these terms).
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tionale, however, has been interpreted in retrospect as a principle under
which the court admits that the regulation of economic activity is a sufficiently important aspect of public authorities' governance as to render a
lower standard of scrutiny acceptable. Another possible explanation is
that commercial speech lies farther away from that which is regarded as
the essential purposes of free speech (the discursive process toward truth,
a foundation for democracy, and the development of the individual self)
than do other forms of expression (in particular, political views)."
Although one should be cautious about analogizing from the free
speech context, I believe nevertheless that both of these factors-the
sovereign state's legitimate need for control over economic activity and
economic activity's remoteness from the essential purpose of certain
ECHR provisions-may explain the court's willingness to adopt a double standard also under ECHR Article 8. It is probably that the closer a
complaint lies to the heart of the purpose of a provision, the less likely
the court will subject it to scrutiny on the basis of a double standard. I
stated above that the essential purpose of the protection of a "home" in
ECHR Article 8 was to protect individuals from arbitrary public power
and that the claim of Colas Est SA and its companion applicants fitted
that purpose only in part. The fact that the Colas Est claim was deemed
to lie farther away from the core of the provision than, say, individuals'
claim for inviolability of their personal home may suffice as an explanation for the court's willingness to adopt a lower standard of scrutiny of
such claims. It might also be, however, that the court accepts that national authorities have a legitimate need to carry out investigatory
measures of business premises given the inherently economic activity
occurring on them.
It must at the same time be recalled that the double standard for
commercial expression in ECHR Article 10 has been criticized by commentators time and again.99 Recent judgments even acknowledge that it
is inherently difficult to distinguish between various categories of
speech. In VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, the court thus
accepted that commercial advertising sometimes takes on political overtones and, consequently, that such expression is removed from a lower
standard of scrutiny.'0° The adoption of a double standard on principle,
therefore, is not necessarily best reconcilable with the direction in which
the court's general jurisprudence might go in the future. For the time
98.
Few commentators have
possible explanations are therefore
note 16.
99.
See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL.,
able").
100.
VgTVerein, 2001-VI Eur.

analyzed the markt intern rationale extensively. These
suggested reasons only. See generally de Meyer, supra
supra note 23, at 402-06 (calling the rationale "remarkCt. H.R. at 264, § 70.
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being, however, the law of the Convention is not wholly unfamiliar with
a system of differentiated scrutiny, as the cases of markt intern, Colas
Est and Niemietz clearly suggest.
C. The Solutions Adopted in ComparableLegal Regimes
From a comparative viewpoint a lower standard of scrutiny for corporate premises is fairly common. This, too, may explain the court's
implicit acceptance of a double standard under ECHR Article 8.
1. The European Union
As was previously mentioned, there exists a fundamental right to
carry out private activity in the legal order of the European Union, as
established by the ECJ in Hoechst AG v. Commission and its two companion cases. Is this fundamental principle interpreted in a way similar
to the Colas Est decision's possible adoption of a lower-tiered standard
of scrutiny for corporate premises?
This question remained unresolved for a long time. The ECJ said little if anything about the possibility of a lower standard of protection of
corporate activity in the privacy context as a fundamental principle of
EU law. The attention of the ECJ was, rather, on the extent to which the
fundamental right to private activity is to be interpreted according to
safeguards similar to those inherent in ECHR Article 8(2) and, more particularly, on whether the fundamental right to private activity also
mandates that investigations carried out on corporate premises presuppose a court warrant. In Hoechst, the ECJ stated that there were no
indications that ECHR Article 8 could be interpreted in a manner that
supported the company claimant's assertion of protection of its premises.
The narrow Hoechst interpretation of ECHR Article 8, which was delivered prior to the European Court of Human Rights delivered its
judgment in Niemietz, would at least entail the possibility that no court
warrant was required under EU law as long as the court in Strasbourg
did not explicitly require it in its interpretation of ECHR Article 8.
The Hoechst rationale on a narrow, individualized reading of ECHR
Article 8 was reiterated as late as 1999, when the Court of First Instance
in its initial consideration of a claim similar to Hoechst in Limburgse
Vinyl MaatschappijNV v. Commission did not consider it relevant for the
scope of privacy protection on corporate premises that the European
Court of Human Rights had seemingly tightened its judicial scrutiny of
0°
to Hoechst.1
searches and seizures in the business context subsequent
Joined Cases T-305, 306, 307, 313, 314, 315, 316, 318, 325, 328, 329 & 335/94,
101.
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-931, 11-1056, 420. The
case concerned facts comparable to those of Hoechst. The judgment of the Court of First In-
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The Court of First Instance thereby effectively dismissed the existence in
EU fundamental rights law of a necessity requirement and proportionality requirement like those required under ECHR Article 8(2) as
additional safeguards to the requirements provided for by the ECJ
01 2 in
Hoechst (basis in law, no arbitrariness, and no excessive measures).
The Luxembourg courts operate within a different structural
framework than does the European Court of Human Rights. One should
be careful not to ascribe the differences in their construction of ECHR
Article 8 simply to a blatant clash of opinions as to its content. There
was, nevertheless, general agreement among commentators that the
Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts came to take different courses in the
area of Article 8 interpretation in the period from the delivery of the
Strasbourg
court's Niemietz and Chappell judgments until very
S103
recently. The Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts engage, however, in a
discourse of mutual exchange and inspiration. It is not unusual for the
two sets of courts to cite each other's judgments, and they by and large
agree on their interpretation of the ECHR. °4
stance was appealed, and the ECJ holding of the case is considered below. For commentary on
the case, see, for example, Rostane Mehdi, Institutions et ordre juridique communautaire
[Community Institutions and Judicial Order], 127 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 436,
445 (2000); Peter R. Willis, "You Have the Right To Remain Silent .... " or Do You? The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Following Mannesmannrohren-Werke and Other Recent
Decisions, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 313 (2001).
102.
In its judgment of October 15, 2002, the ECJ did not find it necessary to clarify
whether the Niemietz holding would or would not have a direct impact on the development of
the Hoechst rationale. Joined Cases C-238, 244, 245, 247, 250, 251, 252 & 254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 1-8375 (concerning
various investigations at the premises of the companies involved) (in French only), available
at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (in English).
103.
See, e.g., Georg Ress, Menschenrechte, europ'isches Gemeinschaftsrecht und
nationales Verfassungsrecht, in STAAT UND RECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FUR GUNTHER WINKLER
897, 917 (Herbert Hailer et al. eds., 1997); Georg Ress & J6rg Ukrow, Neue Aspekte des
Grundrechtsschutzes in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Anmerkungen zum Hoechst-Urteil
des EuGH, 1 EUROP.ISCHES ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 499 (1990); see also Alan
Riley, The ECHR Implications of the Investigative Provisionsof the Draft Competition Regulation, 51 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 55 (2002).
104.
See, e.g., Rick Lawson, Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the
European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourgand Luxembourg, in THE DYNAMICS OF
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE

219, 236 (Rick Lawson & Matthijs de Blois

eds., 1994); Jean-Pierre Puissochet, La Cour europdenne des droits de l'homme, la Cour de
justice des Communautds europdennes et la protection des droits de l'homme [The European
Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, and the Protection
of Human Rights], in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note
45, at 1139; Dean Spielmann, Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Complementarities,in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS
757 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Hans Christian Krtiger & Jbrg Polakiewicz, Proposalsfor a
Coherent Human Rights Protection System in Europe: The European Convention on Human
Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 6-8 (2001);
Catherine Turner, Human Rights Protection in the European Community: Resolving Conflict
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Since the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in
Colas Est, the ECJ, too, has reconsidered its view on corporate privacy.
Partly inspired by the Colas Est rationale, the ECJ today holds that corporate privacy in the form as that presented in Colas Est is part of the
fundamental rights principles of European Union law. In Roquette Fr~res
SA v. Directeur gineral de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la
ripression des fraudes, the ECJ had been asked by the French Cour de
cassationto make a preliminary ruling on the extent to which the Niemietz judgment had in fact overturned or amended the Hoechst rationale in
requiring court orders for searches and seizures also of corporate premises under Community fundamental rights law.'15 In its judgment of
October 22, 2002, the ECJ, in reaffirming that "the need for protection
against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention by public authorities in
the sphere of the private activities of any person, whether natural or legal, constitutes a general principle of Community law,"'06 took into
consideration the developments that had occurred in ECHR case law
since the Hoechst decision, in particular the judgment in Colas Est.'17
The ECJ also concluded that there existed in theory under Community
law a principle that required judicial review by national courts prior to
the undertaking of searches and seizures also of corporate premises.0 8
Significant in Roquette Fr~res was the ECJ's confirmation of the
double standard implied by the European Court of Human Rights in
Colas Est. The ECJ wholeheartedly adopted the view that the judicial
scrutiny of public authorities' searches and seizures of corporate premises might well be less intense than the scrutiny applied to similar
actions taken against the homes of individual persons. In the words of
the court:
For the purposes of determining the scope of [the general principle of protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention
by public authorities in the sphere of the private activities of any
person, whether natural or legal] in relation to the protection of
business premises, regard must be had to the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights subsequent to the judgment in
Hoechst. According to that case-law ... the right of interference
established by Article 8(2) of the ECHR "might well be more

and Overlap Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights, 5 EUR. PUB. L. 453 (1999).
105.
Case C-94/00, Roquette Frres SA v. Directeur gfn6ral de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de la r6pression des fraudes, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9039.
106.
Id. at 1-9053, 27.
107.
Id. at 1-9054, 129.
108.
Id. at 1-9061,154.
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far-reaching where professional or business activities' 9or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case."'
2. The United States
It is a general tendency under the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of
Rights to offer less protection to corporate entities than to individuals.
The negative legacy of the notorious Lochner period of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, in which the corporate world was able to effectively
invalidate government regulation of free enterprise with the help of an
extremely laissez-faire-oriented Supreme Court, has left constitutional
jurisprudence with a "double standard" doctrine, in which economic interests are seen as less deserving of constitutional protection than noneconomic interests.'10
This is also seen in the Supreme Court's interpretation of corporate
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Corporations do not benefit from
protection on equal footing with individuals. As a starting point, it is worth
recalling that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Hale v. Henkel,"'
did not assert an inviolability of corporate premises against government
activity. Rather, the Supreme Court developed a "reasonableness" standard
for measuring the legitimacy of public interferences. Moreover, the Court
expressly stated that the corporation may be forced to give up evidence
because it was "a creature of the State" and consequently had "certain
special privileges and franchises.""I12
Subsequent decisions have considerably clarified the extent to which
corporate premises may legitimately be subject to searches and seizures,
and according to what requirements. The case law has gradually moved
toward greater acceptance of a lower-tiered protection system for corporate premises. United States v. Morton Salt Co."3 reiterated the position
that corporate rights are not coextensive with individual rights under the
Fourth Amendment. So long as the investigation was lawful, the only
limits the Fourth Amendment imposed were that the documents be described with sufficient particularity in the demand and the information
109.
Id. at 1-9054, 29 (citing Colas Est SA v. Fr., App. No. 37971/97, Eur. Ct. H.R.
§ 41 (Apr. 16, 2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int and Niemietz v. F.R.G., 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 23, 34, § 31 (1992)).
110.
See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 9-29 (6th ed. 1994); GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133-62 (5th ed. 1992). The "double
standard" is often ascribed to Justice Stone's comment in footnote 4 of his opinion in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). For details, see Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A CaroleneProducts Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
111.
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
112.
Id. at 74.
113.
338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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sought be reasonably relevant to the inquiry." 4 In See v. City of Seattle,
the Court nonetheless held that the Fourth Amendment required a court
warrant for searches of business property."5 The case involved a business
owner who was convicted for refusing to permit a search of a locked
commercial warehouse by the fire department as part of a routine canvass of businesses to determine their compliance with the fire code." 6
The Court explained that a "businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
7
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.' '
In Katz v. United States, " ' the Court stated significantly that a reasonable expectation of privacy extends to persons "in a business office,
in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab," a statement that seemed to suggest that corporate premises were protected primarily to safeguard not
economic activity but rather the individuals involved in the business concerned." 9 It signaled a string of cases that involved businesses operating
in closely regulated industries such as retail liquor sales and firearms
sales which were found to lie beyond the protective scope of the court
warrant requirement established in See. J' Finally, in Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 2' the Court, in rejecting a Fourth Amendment action
against the use of aerial surveillance photographs to monitor compliance
with emission standards at a chemical plant, found that the industrial
plant was "more comparable to an open field and as such ... open to the
view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in public airspace." Despite Dow Chemical's extensive efforts to shield its facility
from outsiders, the Court permitted government surveillance by adopting
for corporations a narrower definition of the space within which a business has a privacy interest than that accorded to an individual's
residence.'23 This has led one observer to note that:
The Court adheres to its mantra that corporations are protected
by the Fourth Amendment, yet that recitation is largely irrelevant. Instead, the corporation has only an abbreviated
constitutional protection compared to the individual. While the
114.

Id. at 652.

115.
116.
117.
118.

387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 543.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).

119.

Id. at 352.

120.
See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1978); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (both concerning what has been labeled in retrospect as
"pervasively regulated businesses").
121.
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
122.
Id. at 239.
123.
Id.
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Court uses the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" in relation to the corporation, there is no realistic basis for
concluding that a corporate entity has any privacy because that is
a term applicable to individuals, not organizations. The Fourth
Amendment protects the corporation from the government to the
extent that the government may not abuse its power over the
corporation, but it does not create an area protected from the
scrutiny of the sovereign. Unlike the individual, there is no zone
of privacy that a corporation a priori may lay claim to under the
Fourth Amendment.' 24
3. Germany
Article 13(2) and (3) of the German Grundgesetz set forth the requirements pursuant to which public authorities may legitimately
interfere with the "home" (or business premises) of private persons. The
Bundesverfassungsgerichthas interpreted these requirements according
to a double standard by which the premises of businesses must tolerate
more extensive interferences from public authorities than individuals
must with respect to their homes. This rationale was laid down in the
1971 judgment which established the applicability of article 13(1) to
business premises."'
The court's rationale rests on the central premise of its willingness to
include business premises in the protective scope of the provision, notably that the term "home" should always be read in light of the concept of
"physical space for the private sphere" and that the essential purpose of
S 126
the provision was the right of the individual to be left alone. Business
premises are normally farther away from this essential purpose, and this
calls for the exercise of a lower standard of judicial scrutiny as far as
public interference is concerned. The Bundesverfassungsgericht also
emphasized the semipublic character of business premises: given the
public's access to these areas, the proprietors could legitimately expect
less respect for private activity than had the activity concerned personal
private activity."'
The court finally argued that public authorities had a legitimate need
for exercising control over business premises, for instance,
• 128 as in the case
before it, with respect to inspections of such premises. This argument
for a lower standard of judicial review of investigatory measures on
124.
Henning, supra note 65, at 840-41.
125.
BVerfGE 32, 54 (72); see also ALBERT BLECKMANN,
GRUNDRECHTE 1028 (4th ed. 2001); Kunig, supra note 76, at 798.
126.
BETHGE, supra note 69, at 74; Kunig, supra note 75, at 798.
127.
BVerfGE 32, 54 (75).
128.
Id. at 74-75.
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business premises is seen as an example of how the Grundgesetz articulates basic policy principles of balancing free enterprise and regulatory
power on which the Federal Republic of Germany rests. This is referred
to as the Wirtschaftsverfassung discourse, the debate over the character
of the constitution as an economic constitution.129 The double scrutiny
standard applied by the Bundesverfassungsgerichtunder Article 13 may
thus be seen as a result of particular views on the prevalence of free economic activity in a state which rests on a meticulous melange of market
economy, employees' rights, and public control. 30
4. The Court's Need to Make Amends for Its
Generous Interpretation of Article 8(1)
The solutions adopted in the U.S. and German constitutions, in
particular, suggest important reasons for the appropriateness of a system
of differentiated scrutiny to the detriment of corporate premises in the
context of privacy protection. The protection of corporate premises does
not lie at the heart of privacy protection: it is therefore not particularly
surprising that they enjoy a lower level of protection under Article 8 than
individuals do as far as their residential premises are concerned.
Company premises are, moreover, semi-public areas where the
expectations of privacy are naturally lower than those of individual
persons. Finally, it is important to observe the statement of the German
Bundesverfassungsgerichtthat public authorities have a legitimate need
for exercising control over business activity. Although not stated directly,
129.
Veelken,

The fundamental rights aspect is just one of many discursive strands. See Winfried
Wirtschaftsverfassung im Systemvergleich, 55 RABELS ZEITSCHRIIT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 463, 465-66, 472 (1991).
130.
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Law], 16 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 205 (1976); Peter Badura, Staatsziele und Garantiender
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this is probably the justification for the lower level of scrutiny adopted
by the ECJ in its recent Roquette Frkres judgment. The EU fundamental
rights regime operates in a framework in which public authorities are to
make sure that the economic markets run smoothly. Anticompetitive
practices would run counter to the basic premise of guaranteeing a free
market. Unsurprisingly, then, the ECJ acknowledges a certain leeway for
national authorities to interfere on the business premises of corporate
applicants for the purpose of securing evidence of illicit anticompetitive
activity. It is conceivable that a similar argument might have influenced
the European Court of Human Rights to adopt the double standard in
Colas Est.
It might, however, also be that the court, being virtually bound by its
own methods of interpretation to adopt a generous interpretation of Article 8(1) on the level of applicability, saw its own legitimacy threatened if
it did not take openly into account the needs of national authorities to
legitimately control the economic activity within their jurisdiction. As
the court itself gave no reasons for its subscription to a lower level of
protection, such reasons remain speculations only.
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

In this Article, I have considered the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Colas Est SA v. France. In that
judgment, the court established that a publicly held company was entitled to protection of its business premises against unwarranted searches
and seizures carried out by the authorities of the respondent state. This
was the first time that the court explicitly extended the concept of the
right to protection of "home" in Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights to include, at least in certain circumstances, the business
premises of companies. I have explained that although the protection of
business premises' right to privacy may seem peculiar when viewing the
Convention as a treaty in the international human rights tradition, the
result in Colas Est was by no means unsurprising in light of the principles of interpretation generally applied by the court. The extension of
privacy to business premises is also consonant with a longstanding constitutional tradition, as evidenced here by the construction of similar
arrangements in the constitutional orders of the European Union, the
United States, and Germany.
The court in Colas Est likewise seemingly subscribed to a two-tiered
mode of privacy protection in Article 8, in which interference with the privacy of companies is not subjected to the same strict standard of scrutiny
as is generally invoked when the privacy rights of individuals are at stake.
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This, too, is in conformity with the court's practice and is consistent with
the law of comparable constitutional regimes. The court gave no specific
reasons why a double standard is acceptable as far as corporate premises
are concerned. The side glance at comparable constitutional arrangements,
however, gives important clues as to the rationale of a double standard,
which might also have influenced the judgment of the court in Colas Est.
As will have become evident from the discussion in this Article, the
generally accommodating response to companies' claims in the
European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European
Court of Human Rights, illustrates the commonalities between the
Convention and constitutional legal regimes. The Convention, however,
is not only a supranational constitutional instrument for the European
legal order.' It is also part of the international law of human rights, that
system of international and regional treaties of international law for the
protection of various forms of human .--rights
132 norms emanating from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Convention is singular
among international human rights law treaties in its inclusive approach
to corporate human rights protection."' The Colas Est judgment
exemplifies the court's aptitude for including corporate actors even under
provisions whose doctrinal background at best offers an ambiguous
answer to such claims. As has been shown above, the judgment is not the
only one of its kind to extend the protective scope of provisions
previously thought to be reserved only to individuals to encompass

131.
On the constitutionalization of international human rights law, see Jacques Robert,
Constitutionaland InternationalProtection of Human Rights: Competing or Complementary
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COURT OF JUSTICE FOR PERSONAL LIBERTIES ON THE WAY TO A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
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corporate activity. 3 4 Regardless of the reservations in the judgment to the
specific circumstances of the case, Colas Est signals the Convention's
capability of transforming itself in accordance with the nature of claims
brought before the court. The Convention protects not only the
inalienable rights and freedoms of the individual human being qua
physical person, which was arguably the main purpose of the Convention
when it was adopted in the wake of the international human rights law
revolution after World War II. It protects also, and increasingly, the
private sphere generally against the regulatory powers of public
authorities of the member states of the Council of Europe. This aspect of
the Convention, its economic overtones in the company setting included,
may appropriately be referred to as an inherently constitutional function.
Thus understood, the Colas Est judgment serves as evidence of the
ongoing constitutionalization of the European Convention on Human
Rights.

134.
See, e.g., Comingersoll SA v. Port., 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355. 1 consider the expansive quality of the Comingersolljudgment in a forthcoming publication, Emberland, supra
note 48.

